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INTRODUCTION
In June, 2005, the United States Supreme Court set forth an "in-
ducement" rule in MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. that imposes
secondary liability on "one who distributes a device with the object of
promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or
other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement."1 The Court empha-
sized the limitations of the liability standard it was setting forth, stating
that the target was only "purposeful, culpable expression and conduct,
and thus does nothing to compromise legitimate commerce or discour-
age innovation having a lawful promise., 2 Yet, the liability standard set
forth in Grokster is not as clear or as precise as the Court's opinion sug-
gested. Moreover, it has potential implications for the scope of
secondary liability under the Patent Act as well.
The Copyright Act contains no statutory language referring to "in-
ducement to infringe," "contributory infringement," or any other type of
secondary or vicarious liability. Rather, the courts have exported these
t © 2006 by Lynda J. Oswald.
* Professor of Business Law, Stephen M. Ross School of Business at the University
of Michigan. I would like to thank Thomas Rooney, J.D. 2008 (exp.), University of Michigan,
for his outstanding research assistance.
1. 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2780 (2005).
2. Id.
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theories of indirect liability from the Patent Act, where they are explicit,
and have read them into copyright law.3 Thus, the Grokster Court drew
its liability standard for inducement of copyright infringement from the
inducement of infringement liability provision of the Patent Act. It is not
surprising that the Court did so--the relationship between the law relat-
ing to copyright infringement and patent infringement has been closely
intertwined for many decades, and the Supreme Court itself has drawn
upon the intricate relationship between the two areas in crafting its copy-
right jurisprudence, both in Grokster and in earlier cases.'
Unfortunately, however, the contours of liability for inducement of
infringement under the Patent Act have been unclear historically. The
decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit have
spawned two competing lines of cases: one imposing a broader scope of
liability for inducement to infringe because of a weaker intent standard,
and one imposing a narrower scope of liability because of a stronger in-
tent standard.5 The Supreme Court ignored this intra-circuit split in
Grokster, leaving unsettled both the parameters of indirect infringement
liability in copyright law and the impact that Grokster is likely to have
on the development of inducement of infringement jurisprudence under
patent law.
Thus, two critical aspects of Grokster are its potential impact on the
development of indirect liability under both copyright and patent law
and, most importantly, its potential influence on our understanding of the
"intent" element of inducement of infringement in both areas. As dis-
cussed below,6 inducement liability first evolved in the patent context
through case law. It was codified in the Patent Act and imported into
copyright law by the courts, even though no statutory basis for such li-
ability exists in that context. Then, in Grokster, the Supreme Court
3. For an overview of secondary liability in copyright law, see Ryan Pohlman, Note,
Inducement and Grokster: Guarding Against the Pitfalls of Copyright Owners' New Weapon,
55 DEPAUL L. REv. 1309, 1310-12 (2006).
4. For example, in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the Court
held:
If vicarious liability is to be imposed on Sony in this case, it must rest on the fact
that it has sold equipment with constructive knowledge of the fact that its customers
may use that equipment to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted material.
There is no precedent in the law of copyright for the imposition of vicarious liabil-
ity on such a theory. The closest analogy is provided by the patent law cases to
which it is appropriate to refer because of the historic kinship between patent law
and copyright law.
464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984). The Court went on to note, however, that "[t]he two areas of the
law, naturally, are not identical twins, and we exercise the caution which we have expressed in
the past in applying doctrine formulated in one area to the other." Id. at 439 n. 19.
5. See infra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
6. See infra Part I.
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expounded upon the meaning of intent for inducement of infringement in
the copyright area. That language has since been adopted by the Federal
Circuit in analyzing the intent standard for inducement in the patent
area.' It is worth exploring whether these incremental judicial alterations
in what is fundamentally a statutory area of patent law intrude upon the
proper relationship between the courts and the legislature, and whether
these changes result in rational or piecemeal development of the legal
standards pertaining to inducement of infringement liability in patent
law.
I. INDUCEMENT OF INFRINGEMENT UNDER THE PATENT ACT
Direct infringement liability has been a statutory notion since en-
actment of the very first patent act in 1790.8 Indirect patent infringement
liability, by contrast, initially developed as a form of common law. Over
a century ago, the courts recognized that extending liability only to the
direct infringer might well enable others whose culpability in the infring-
.ing activities is even greater to escape liability.9 Thus, the courts
developed a doctrine of contributory liability, under which those who did
not directly infringe yet nonetheless helped others to infringe by supply-
ing a component part specially adapted to infringement could also be
held liable.' ° In addition, another line of cases developed, addressing
situations in which the component had non-infringing uses, but was used
7. See MEMC Electronic Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420
F.3d 1369, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d
1354 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (discussed infra Part III).
8. See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112, § 4.
9. The Grokster Court also recognized this point: "[I]t may be impossible to enforce
rights in the protected work effectively against all direct infringers, the only practical alterna-
tive being to go against the distributor of the copying device for secondary liability on a theory
of contributory or vicarious infringement." 125 S. Ct. at 2776 (citation omitted).
10. Charles W. Adams, A Brief History of Indirect Liability for Patent Infringement, 22
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 369, 371-72 (2006) (discussing Wallace v.
Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100), which was the first case to recog-
nize that a person can be liable for infringement by making or selling an unpatented element
for use in a patented combination or process (i.e., contributory infringement)); see Hewlett-
Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1468-69 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("Prior to the
enactment of the Patent Act of 1952, there was no statute which defined what constituted
infringement. However, infringement was judicially divided into two categories: 'direct in-
fringement,' which was the unauthorized making, using or selling of the patented invention,
and 'contributory infringement,' which was any other activity where, although not technically
making, using, or selling, the defendant displayed sufficient culpability to be held liable as an
infringer. Such liability was under a theory of joint tortfeasance, wherein one who intention-
ally caused, or aided and abetted, the commission of a tort by another was jointly and
severally liable with the primary tortfeasor.") (citations omitted).
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for infringing purposes." The courts did not want to go so far as to
automatically hold liable a defendant who sold a component that had
both infringing and non-infringing uses; rather, the courts required evi-
dence that the defendant was actually encouraging infringement by the
end users (i.e., the direct infringers).' 2 Thus, inducement of infringement
was initially treated as a subset of contributory infringement. 
3
After developing for several decades in the patent law jurisprudence,
these notions of contributory infringement were codified in the Patent
Act of 1952, in section 271.' 4 The Patent Act codified inducement of in-
fringement in section 271(b) and contributory infringement in section
271(c),'5 dividing what had previously been a single notion of secondary
liability for patent infringement into two separate causes of action, and
drawing a distinction between direct and indirect infringement. The two
types of infringement are related, however, in the sense that under the
11. E.g., Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Precise Mfg. Corp., II F.2d 209, 212 (2d
Cir. 1926) ("A device capable of an infringing use, and sold with the intent that it should be so
used, is an infringement of the patent, even though the same device is capable of a noninfring-
ing use, and even though there may be a form for instructions that it shall be used in a
noninfringing way.").
12. See 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 17.02(1) (2006).
13. See Mark A. Lemley, Inducing Patent Infringement, 39 U.C. DAVis L. REv. 225,
227 (2005).
14. See CHISUM, supra note 12, at § 17.02; Adams, supra note 10, at 370.
15. The legislative history stated:
The doctrine of contributory infringement has been part of our law for about 80
years. It has been applied to enjoin those who sought to cause infringement by sup-
plying someone else with the means and directions for infringing a patent. One who
makes a special device constituting the heart of a patented machine and supplies it
to another with directions (specific or implied) to complete the machine is obvi-
ously appropriating the benefit of the patented invention. It is for this reason that
the doctrine of contributory infringement, which prevents appropriating another
man's patented invention, has been characterized as "an expression both of law and
morals." Considerable doubt and confusion as to the scope of contributory in-
fringement has resulted from a number of decisions of the courts in recent years.
The purpose of this section is to codify in statutory form principles of contributory
infringement and at the same time eliminate this doubt and confusion. Paragraph
(b) recites in broad terms that one who aids and abets an infringement is likewise an
infringer. The principle of contributory infringement is set forth in the provisions of
the next paragraph which is more concerned with the usual situation in which con-
tributory infringement arises. This latter paragraph is much more restricted than
many proponents of contributory infringement believe should be the case. The sale
of a component of a patented machine, etc., must constitute a material part of the
invention and must be known to be especially made or especially adapted for use in
the infringement before there can be contributory infringement, and likewise the
sale of staple articles of commerce suitable for noninfringement use does not con-
stitute contributory infringement. The last paragraph of this section provides that
one who merely does what he is authorized to do by statute is not guilty of misuse
of the patent.
S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 8 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, at 9 (1952).
Intent Element of "Inducement to Infringe"
Patent Act secondary liability cannot exist in the absence of direct in-
fringement by another party. 6
Section 271 (a) of the Patent Act addresses direct infringement, pro-
viding that one who practices the patented invention shall be liable for
infringement.' 7 This is true regardless of whether the defendant was
aware of the patent at the time he or she was infringing it, or whether the
defendant had any intent to infringe. The defendant's lack of willfulness
or bad faith only affects the availability of enhanced damages under sec-
tion 284 of the Patent Act,'8 and not whether liability exists in the first
place. Thus, liability for direct infringement of a patent is, in effect, a
strict liability provision.' 9
Contributory infringement was codified in section 271(c).0 Con-
tributory infringement holds liable those who supply a component of a
patented invention, where the component is not technically part of the
patented invention or process yet has no other substantial non-infringing
use except in the patented invention or process. Section 271(c) makes
explicit reference to knowledge, imposing liability where the defendant
sells a component of a patented invention "knowing the same to be espe-
cially made or especially adapted for use in" infringing a patent."
Section 271(b) essentially codified all other types of activity consti-
tuting "contributory infringement" prior to 1952,22 and so is clearly
16. Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. Eon Labs Mfg., Inc., 363 F.3d 1306, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
("When indirect infringement is at issue, it is well settled that there can be no inducement or
contributory infringement absent an underlying direct infringement'"); Met-Coil Sys. Corp. v.
Korners Unlimited, Inc., 803 F.2d 684, 687 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("Absent direct infringement of
the patent claims, there can be neither contributory infringement nor inducement of infringe-
ment") (citations omitted).
17. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000) ("[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to
sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States
any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.").
18. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000) (allowing the court in its discretion to increase damages up
to three times the amount found or assessed); see Vulcan Eng'g Co. v. Fata Aluminum, Inc.,
278 F.3d 1366, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("The rules of patent infringement are rules of business
ethics, and require prudent commercial actions in accordance with law. 35 U.S.C. § 284 pro-
vides remedy to the patentee when these standards are not met, up to three times the amount
of found or assessed damages.") (citation omitted).
19. Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F3d 1566, 1570 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("Infringement itself
... is a strict liability offense .... ); see Intel Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821,
832 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("[Tlhere is no intent element to direct infringement."); see generally
Lynda J. Oswald, The Personal Liability of Corporate Officers for Patent Infringement, 44
IDEA 115, 122 (2003) (discussing the underlying bases of liability under section 271 of the
Patent Act).
20. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000) ("Whoever offers to sell ... a component of a patented
machine . . . knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an in-
fringement of such patent, and not a staple article... of commerce.., suitable for substantial
noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.").
21. Id. (emphasis added).
22. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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broader in scope than section 271(c) liability. Section 271(b) imposes
liability for inducement of infringement, providing that "[w]hoever ac-
tively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer."
23
Inducement of infringement, therefore, applies to those who supply a
product or service that does have substantial non-infringing uses if the
supplier also encourages that product or service to be used in an infring-
ing fashion. Imposition of secondary liability in the patent law arena
gives patent owners protection in cases where suing the direct infringers
is impracticable (such as where the direct infringers are financially inca-
pable of compensating the patentee for its damages, or are customers of
the patentee), or where the actual infringement by each direct infringer is
so small that the costs of litigation would overwhelm the recovery, even
though the aggregate damages caused by the direct infringement might
24be very large. In such an instance, suing the indirect infringer may be a
more practical and pragmatic approach; moreover, depending upon the
circumstances, the indirect infringer might be more morally culpable for
the infringement than the direct infringer. The flip side of the secondary
liability coin is that secondary liability should not be imposed on inap-
propriate parties or in a way that would impede the stream of lawful
25
commerce.
Section 271(b) has no explicit intent requirement. Rather, the statu-
tory language on its face appears to be directed to conduct, not intent,
requiring that the defendant actively induce infringement.26 Nevertheless,
the courts have read an intent requirement into the statutory language of
section 271(b), 27 and it is now firmly ensconced in Federal Circuit juris-
prudence,28 making inducement of infringement under the Patent Act
23. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2000).
24. Lemley, supra note 13, at 228; see CHISUM, supra note 12, § 17.04(4)(f); see also
Michael N. Rader, Toward a Coherent Law of Inducement to Infringe: Why the Federal Circuit
Should Adopt the Hewlett-Packard Standard for Intent Under § 271(b), 10 FED. CIR. B. J. 299,
300 (2001); Justin Hughes, On the Logic of Suing One's Customers and the Dilemma of In-
fringement-Based Business Models, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 725, 728 (2005).
25. Lemley, supra note 13, at 228 ("[T]he law must take equal care to avoid imposing
liability on those who participate in the stream of lawful commerce merely because their
products can be misused.").
26. 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(b) (2000).
27. The court's approach is explained at least in part by the manner in which the com-
mon law led to the development of these two statutory provisions. See supra notes 8-13 and
accompanying text. Pre-1952 case law required a higher showing of knowledge and intent for
the subset of inducement of infringement than for contributory infringement. CHISUM, supra
note 12, § 17.04(2).
28. See, e.g., Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) ("On its face, § 271(b) ... certainly does not speak of any intent requirement to
prove active inducement. However, in view of the very definition of 'active inducement' in
pre-1952 case law and the fact that § 27 1(b) was intended as merely a codification of pre-1952
law, we are of the opinion that proof of actual intent to cause the acts which constitute the
Intent Element of "Inducement to Infringe"
more akin to an intentional tort 9 than to the strict liability standard of
direct patent infringement.
The contours of liability for inducement of infringement under the
Patent Act are murky, at best. The Federal Circuit has acknowledged a
sharp intra-circuit split in its jurisprudence relating to the type of intent
required to support an inducement of infringement action under section
27 1(b) of the Patent Act.3" In sharp contravention of the Federal Circuit's
own rules of precedent,3' two panels of the court issued different intent
standards for inducement of patent infringement within three months of
each other in 1990, creating confusion in the applicable standards for
inducement liability that persists even to today.
In the first of these two cases, Hewlett-Packard v. Bausch & Lomb,
Inc.," the Federal Circuit imposed a lower intent standard-"proof of
actual intent to cause the acts which constitute the infringement ' '33-
which resulted in a broader scope of inducement liability. Under the
Hewlett-Packard standard of intent, a defendant can be held liable pro-
vided it encouraged the acts that formed the basis for the direct
infringement claim. The defendant's good faith beliefs as to the legality
of its acts are irrelevant to this inquiry3 and do not excuse the defen-
dant's actions or mitigate its liability.
In contrast, the Federal Circuit's decision in Manville Sales v. Para-
mount Systems,3' decided just three months after Hewlett-Packard,
infringement is a necessary prerequisite to finding active inducement."); Water Techs. Corp. v.
Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("Although § 271(b) does not use the word
'knowing' the case law and legislative history uniformly assert such a requirement."); Lemley,
supra note 13, at 238 (stating that "the specific intent requirement is well-established in the
law" and citing various Federal Circuit cases). In addition, Judge Giles Rich, the drafter of the
1952 Patent Act, stated that "the evidence must establish active inducement and that involves
intent." Giles S. Rich, Infringement Under Section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952, 21 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 521, 537 (1953).
29. The necessary intent may be shown by either circumstantial or direct evidence.
MEMC Electronic Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 1369, 1378
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1988));
see also Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 E2d 1261, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
30. See MEMC, 420 F3d at 1378 (" '[Tihere is a lack of clarity concerning whether the
required intent must be merely to induce the specific acts [of infringement] or additionally to
cause an infringement."' (quoting MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1332
(Fed. Cir. 2005))).
31. See, e.g., UMC Electronics Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 652 n.6 (Fed. Cir.
1987) ("A panel of this court is bound by prior precedential decisions unless and until over-
turned in banc .").
32. 909 F.2d 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
33. Id. at 1458. By contrast, the court stated that section 271(c) requires "only proof of
a defendant's knowledge, not intent, that his activity cause infringement." Id.
34. See also Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1318 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (relying upon Hewlett-Packard in stating that "the only intent required of [the accused
infringer] is the intent to cause the acts that constitute infringement").
35. 917 F.2d 544 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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provided for a higher intent standard, thus leading to a narrower scope of
liability for inducement of infringement. In the words of the Manville
court: "It must be established that the defendant possessed specific intent
to encourage another's infringement and not merely that the defendant
had knowledge of the acts alleged to constitute inducement.,16 Thus, un-
der the Manville standard, the defendant must have a culpable intent in
order to be liable. A good faith belief that the encouraged acts are not
infringing (e.g., a belief that the defendant's product does not infringe or
that the plaintiff's patent is invalid based upon the advice of competent
patent counsel) would protect the defendant from liability for induce-
ment of infringement. 7
The difference between the Manville and Hewlett-Packard standards
is an important one. An alleged patent inducer may in good faith believe
that the acts of the direct infringers are outside the scope of the patent
and thus non-infringing, or that the patent itself is invalid. Under Man-
ville, the alleged inducer would have no liability; under Hewlett-Packard,
the alleged inducer would be liable. The Federal Circuit has long recog-
nized the inconsistency of its positions in these two cases, but has failed
to reconcile the decisions.38 Often, the court has been able to finesse the
difference between the two lines of cases by finding that a defendant's
actions satisfied the higher standard of intent of Manville, and thus im-
plicitly satisfied the lower standard of Hewlett-Packard as well. This
allows the court to disregard the difference between the two standards in
the specific case before it.39
36. Id. at 553.
37. In Manville, the company had relied upon the opinion of counsel that its device did
not infringe and so it was not liable for infringement. See also Ferguson Beauregard/Logic
Controls v. Mega Systems, LLC, 359 F.3d 1327, 1341-42 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("[Manville] makes
clear that 'it must be established that the defendant possessed specific intent to encourage
another's infringement and not merely that the defendant had knowledge of the acts alleged to
constitute infringement.'" (quoting Manville, 917 F.2d at 553)).
38. Manville, however, is clearly the favored approach. Lemley, supra note 13, at 240
n.71.
39. See, e.g., MEMC Electronic Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp.,
420 F.3d 1369, 1378 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("We need not resolve that ambiguity in this case,
however, because it is undisputed that [the defendant] had knowledge of the ... patent. Thus,
assuming that [the plaintiff] is able to demonstrate that [the defendant] had intent to induce the
specific acts constituting infringement, intent additionally to cause an infringement can be
presumed."); MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 E3d 1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting
that there is a "lack of clarity" about the intent required for inducement, and that at a mini-
mum the patentee must show "that the alleged inducer had knowledge of the infringing acts in
order to demonstrate either level of intent"); Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 394 F.3d
1368, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting the lack of clarity in the standard, but finding that
"substantial evidence supports the jury's finding of intent under either" standard); Insituform
Technologies, Inc. v. CAT Contracting, Inc., 385 F.3d 1360, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (finding
"sufficient evidence" to support the lower court's finding of intent under either standard).
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The level of intent required under section 271(b) thus was uncertain
at the time that the Supreme Court decided Grokster, and remains uncer-
tain today. Interestingly, the Supreme Court never discussed, or even
acknowledged, this intra-circuit split when it imported section 271(b)
liability into copyright law. It is not clear whether the Court was aware
of this split, or whether it considered the effect the split might have on
the rule it set forth in Grokster. This leaves open, then, the question of
what effect Grokster has on our understanding of the intent element of
inducement of infringement in the patent arena.
II. SECONDARY LIABILITY UNDER THE
COPYRIGHT ACT: GROKSTER
The facts in Grokster were very typical of cases involving indirect
liability for patent infringement. Defendants Grokster, Ltd. and Stream-
Cast Networks, Inc. distributed free software that permitted computer
users to share electronic files through peer-to-peer networks. They de-
veloped their software in the wake of Napster's disastrous and failed
attempts to protect its Internet file-sharing service against copyright in-
fringement litigation brought by music publishers and record
companies.4 0 Grokster and StreamCast gambled that technology differ-
ences would save them from Napster's fate. While Napster had used a
central server system to maintain an index of available files and had me-
diated file transfers between users,4 ' Grokster's and StreamCast's
software allowed computer users to communicate directly over peer-to-
peer networks. 2 Because Grokster and StreamCast did not have central
servers, they argued that they had no knowledge of which files were cop-
ied or when files were copied, and hence had little or no control over the
users' behavior. Nonetheless, neither Grokster nor StreamCast attempted
to filter out copyrighted files or prevent users from downloading them,43
and both distributed promotional materials advertising the availability of
specific copyrighted songs over their networks.44
The plaintiffs in Grokster consisted of the major movie studios and
record companies, and various music publishers and songwriters. The
plaintiffs claimed that the defendants' software enabled the unauthorized
40. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
41. Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 905-08.
42. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2770 (2005).
43. Id. at 2774 ("[Tjhere is no evidence that either company made an effort to filter
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transfer of copyrighted works, such as music and video files, and that the
defendants intended, promoted, and profited from these acts of infringe-
ment. Thus, the plaintiffs argued, the defendants should be held
secondarily liable for the direct infringement of the copyrighted works
by their users.
The technology at issue could facilitate the transfer of any type of
electronic file, both infringing and non-infringing. However, the plain-
tiffs produced evidence that defendants' software was predominantly
used to distribute copyrighted works without the permission of the copy-
right owners and without paying royalties.4'5 The plaintiffs also produced
evidence of the defendants' active steps to encourage this extensive di-
rect infringement by end users,46 as well as the financial dependence of
the defendants' business models upon such infringement.
The District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants,
finding that secondary liability could not attach where the defendants did
not have actual knowledge of specific acts of infringement. 4 A unani-
mous panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed,' 9 based in large part upon the
Ninth Circuit's own prior interpretations of the Supreme Court's decision
in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.5° In Sony, the
Supreme Court held that the manufacturer of a VCR could not be liable
for contributory copyright infringement, even if some (or many) of the
consumers used the product to infringe copyrights, because the VCR was
capable of commercially significant non-infringing uses. The Ninth Cir-
cuit interpreted Sony to mean that contributory liability could not attach
if a product had any substantial non-infringing use unless the distributor
had actual knowledge of the infringement and failed to respond to that
knowledge.5' If a distributor actually knew of specific infringing uses at a
time when the infringer could prevent the infringement but declined to
45. Id. at 2772 (Plaintiffs' "evidence gives reason to think that the vast majority of
users' downloads are acts of infringement, and because well over 100 million copies of the
software in question are known to have been downloaded, and billions of files are shared
across the [defendants'] networks each month, the probable scope of copyright infringement is
staggering.").
46. Id. ("The record is replete with evidence that from the moment [plaintiffs] began to
distribute their free software, each one clearly voiced the objective that recipients use it to
download copyrighted works, and each took active steps to encourage infringement.").
47. Id. at 2774 ("[T]he business models employed by [defendants] confirm that their
principal object was use of their software to download copyrighted works.").
48. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
49. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004).
50. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
51. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2775. The Ninth Circuit also found that the defendants were
not liable under a vicarious liability theory because they did not "monitor or control the use of
the software, had no agreed-upon right or current ability to supervise its use, and had no inde-
pendent duty to police infringement." Id. The Ninth Circuit interpreted Sony similarly in
Napster. A& M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
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do so, the distributor could incur liability. Because Grokster and
StreamCast did not maintain central servers, they could not respond to
an infringement and hence, the Ninth Circuit concluded, could not be
liable for contributory infringement."
The Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of
Sony, unanimously vacated the Ninth Circuit's judgment, and remanded
the case for further proceedings. The Grokster Court held: "one who dis-
tributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken
to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by
third parties."53 As in Sony, the Grokster Court turned explicitly to patent
law for guidance in setting forth the parameters of secondary liability for
copyright law. In so doing, the Court highlighted once again the rather
odd and tortuous relationship between secondary liability in patent law
and secondary liability in copyright law.
Grokster provides an apt example of why the courts and legislature
felt the need to adopt secondary infringement liability, first in patent law,
and then in copyright law. Grokster is, in fact, the prototypical induce-
ment case: many small, individual infringers, each inflicting a small
injury and each relatively judgment-proof, and one or a few alleged in-
ducers, each possessing significantly deeper pockets. The direct
infringers in Grokster are the multitude of individual users of the peer-
to-peer networks, who use the networks to illegally download copy-
righted materials. Identifying and taking action against these individual
users is cumbersome, expensive, and offensive to those whom the copy-
right holders would like to have become lawful, paying consumers of the
copyrighted materials. The courts (followed in the patent arena by the
legislature) have recognized that in instances such as these, it is not only
52. Grokster, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004).
53. 125 S. Ct. at 2780. However, the Grokster Court did not overrule Sony, expressly
leaving consideration of Sony to a later day. The Court stated:
[B]ecause we find below that it was error to grant summary judgment to the com-
panies on MGM's inducement claim, we do not revisit Sony further, as MGM
requests, to add a more quantified description of the point of balance between pro-
tection and commerce when liability rests solely on distribution with knowledge
that unlawful use will occur. It is enough to note that the Ninth Circuit's judgment
rested on an erroneous understanding of Sony and to leave further consideration of
the Sony rule for a day when that may be required.
Id. at 2778-79.
54. See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 24, at 728. This, of course, has not prevented the mu-
sic industry from targeting specific individuals in highly publicized litigation, in an effort to
deter other potential infringers. See, e.g., Katie Dean, RIAA Legal Landslide Begins, WIRED
NEWS, Sep. 8, 2003, http://www.wired.comlnews/digiwood/0,1412,60245,00.html (noting that
on September 9, 2003, the RIAA filed suits against 261 people accused of illegally distributing
copyrighted music files on peer-to-peer networks).
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the direct infringers who should be held liable but those who encourage
and enable such direct infringement as well. While the injury inflicted by
each individual direct infringer may be very small, the aggregated injury
made possible by the machinations of the inducer of that direct in-
fringement may be crushingly large.
However, the Grokster Court's treatment of secondary liability in the
copyright context was unclear, and meshes uneasily, at best, with its ear-
lier holding in Sony. In Sony, the U.S. Supreme Court imported the
"capable of substantial non-infringing use" test directly from the con-
tributory infringement language of section 271(c) of the Patent Act, to
create copyright liability for the sale of a good that has no substantial use
but to infringe. The Sony adaptation was not exact, however, since sec-
tion 271(c) applies to a component of a patented machine, while the
Sony Court applied the test to the device (VCR) as a whole.55
The Grokster Court acknowledged the Sony Court's borrowing of
the Patent Act's contributory infringement language, and went one step
further by also importing the inducement rule from section 271(b) of the
Patent Act.56 The Court acknowledged limits to the rule it was setting
forth, recognizing "the need to keep from trenching on regular com-
merce or discouraging the development of technologies with lawful and
unlawful potential. 57 The Court qualified its holding by stating that:
[M]ere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual infringing
uses would not be enough here to subject a distributor to liabil-
ity. Nor would ordinary acts incident to product distribution ...
support liability in themselves. The inducement rule, instead,
premises liability on purposeful, culpable expression and con-
duct, and thus does nothing to compromise legitimate commerce
or discourage innovation having a lawful promise.58
The Grokster Court did little to clarify Sony or the role of intent in indi-
rect copyright infringement liability. By stating that "[o]ne infringes
55. One commentator notes that under patent law, the VCR would have been addressed
under section 271(b), not section 271(c), and speculates that this may be part of the cause of
the confusion in the cases. Timothy R. Holbrook, The Intent Element of Induced Infringement,
22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L. J. 399, 402 n.14 (2006).
56. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2780 ("For the same reasons that Sony took the staple-article
doctrine of patent law as a model for its copyright safe-harbor rule, the inducement rule, too,
is a sensible one for copyright. We adopt it here... .
57. Id.
58. Id. This theme of protecting the free flow of commerce is a recurring one in Su-
preme Court copyright jurisprudence. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (noting the importance of "strik[ing] a balance be-
tween a copyright holder's legitimate demand for effective-not merely symbolic-protection
of the statutory monopoly, and the rights of others freely to engage in substantially unrelated
areas of commerce").
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contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringe-
ment,' 59  the Grokster Court essentially redefined contributory
infringement in the copyright context by replacing the knowledge re-
quirement found in the statutory language of the Patent Act (which the
court was purportedly borrowing for copyright purposes) with an intent
element instead. The Grokster Court also recharacterized Sony, redefin-
ing the case as prohibiting imputation of intent, rather than knowledge.
6
0
The Court indicated that although Sony knew its product could be used
for infringing purposes, the Sony rule "limits imputing culpable intent as
a matter of law from the characteristics or uses of a distributed prod-
uct."' 6' Sony was not liable for infringement because "[t]here was no
evidence that Sony had expressed an object of bringing about taping in
violation of copyright or had taken active steps to increase its profits
from unlawful taping ' 62 and because no such unlawful objective could be
presumed.
However, the Grokster Court went on to explain that "nothing in
Sony requires courts to ignore evidence of intent if there is such evi-
dence, and the case was never meant to foreclose rules of fault-based
liability derived from the common law.' 63 The Court concluded that if the
evidence at trial indicates that Grokster and StreamCast intended to en-
courage inducement, then they could be held liable for infringement
even if their products were capable of substantial non-infringing uses.64
Although the Grokster Court did not determine the liability of the
defendants for inducement of infringement of copyright (leaving that
factual determination to the lower court on remand), the Court made it
abundantly clear that inducement in the copyright context hinges on cul-
pable intent and an unlawful objective.6 The Court, in fact, specifically
referred to inducement of infringement as "fault-based liability"66 and
stated that inducement requires an "intent to bring about infringement.
' 67
Grokster clearly redefined the intent element of inducement of in-
fringement in the copyright context, but the exact scope of that
redefinition remains unclear. The Court set forth a rule based on both
59. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2776.
60. Id. at 2778 ("Sony barred secondary liability based on presuming or imputing intent
to cause infringement solely from the design or distribution of a product capable of substantial
lawful use, which the distributor knows is in fact used for infringement.").
61. Id. at 2779.
62. Id. at 2777.
63. Id. at 2779.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2780.
66. Id. at 2779.
67. Id. at 2782.
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expression and conduct.68 Although the Court treated Grokster as a case
of active inducement, it did not define what "clear expression or other
affirmative steps ''69 would generally suffice to make a showing of in-
ducement liability. On the one hand, mere distribution, even with
knowledge of infringing potential or actual infringement, is not sufficient
to subject the distributor to liability, nor "would ordinary acts incident to
product distribution, such as offering customers technical support or
product updates, support liability in themselves., 70 However, an alleged
inducer could be held liable if it engaged in conduct or statements that
"clearly voiced the objective ... of encourag[ing] infringement."7 A
"classic case" of inducement would include advertising an infringing use
71or instructing others how to engage in an infringing use.
The Grokster Court also indicated that the intent necessary to sup-
port secondary liability for copyright infringement must be obvious: "If
liability for inducing infringement is ultimately found, it will not be on
the basis of presuming or imputing fault, but from inferring a patently
illegal objective from statements and actions showing what that objective
was." 73 It would appear, then, that the Grokster Court intended liability to
attach only if the defendant had specific intent to cause infringement.74
III. IMPLICATIONS OF GROKSTER FOR INDUCEMENT OF INFRINGEMENT
UNDER THE PATENT ACT: WHAT "INTENT" IS REQUIRED?
What, if anything, does Grokster tell us about the appropriate pa-
rameters of the intent element for inducement of infringement under the
68. Id. ("The inducement rule, instead, premises liability on purposeful, culpable ex-
pression and conduct....
69. Id. at 2770.
70. Id. at 2780.
71. Id. at 2777.
72. Id. at 2779. The Court stated that "[piroving a message was sent out ... is the pre-
eminent but not exclusive way of showing that active steps were taken with the purpose of
bringing about infringing acts . I..." ld. at 2781. The Court provided three examples of "other
evidence" (or "complement[s] to direct evidence of unlawful objective") that demonstrated
that these defendants "acted with a purpose to cause copyright violations...." Id. First, "each
company ... aim[ed] to satisfy a known source of demand for copyright infringement .... "
Id. Second, the defendants failed to develop a filtering tool to reduce infringing activity, id.,
though the Court noted that "in the absence of other evidence of intent, a court would be un-
able to find contributory infringement liability merely based on a failure to take affirmative
steps to prevent infringement, if the device otherwise was capable of substantial noninfringing
uses. Such a holding would tread too close to the Sony safe harbor." Id. at 2781 n.12. Third,
the defendants' business plans and profitability depended upon infringing conduct, though the
Court noted that "[tihis evidence alone would not justify an inference of unlawful intent ......
Id. at 2781-82.
73. ld. at 2782.
74. Id. at 2778 (in other words, "an actual purpose to cause infringing use").
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Patent Act? There are already early suggestions in the Federal Circuit's
jurisprudence that the circle is being closed on this issue. Grokster
looked explicitly to patent law for the intent standard for inducement of
infringement in the copyright area. At least two post-Grokster panels of
the Federal Circuit have cited Grokster in assessing liability for induce-
ment of infringement in the patent law area." Given that Grokster itself
is such an opaque decision, we should be concerned that if the new stan-
dards set in the copyright arena are now applied back to patent law, we
will end up with less clarity in both areas of the law.
Grokster is more similar to the Manville line of cases in patent law,
which require a culpable intent to encourage direct infringement, than to
the Hewlett-Packard line of cases, which impose inducement of in-
fringement liability for encouraging infringing acts regardless of the
defendant's good faith beliefs. Moreover, because Grokster rests on pol-
icy grounds of protecting "legitimate commerce" and the promotion of
"innovation having a lawful promise,"76 the culpability standard articu-
lated by the Court in the copyright arena would seem, on its face, to
translate seamlessly to the patent law arena. The same public policy con-
siderations that drove the analysis in Grokster apply in the patent law
area as well; in fact, the Court has noted elsewhere the importance of not
allowing patent liability rules to impede "the wheels of commerce. 77
One should proceed down this path only with extreme caution. There
are real dangers in treating patent law and copyright law as parallel areas
of intellectual property law. Although the Sony Court referred to the
75. In MEMC Electronic Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., the
Federal Circuit reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment of non-infringement
based on inducement of infringement and remanded for further proceedings. The court spe-
cifically quoted Grokster's language regarding intent: "'Evidence of active steps taken to
encourage direct infringement, such as advertising an infringing use or instructing how to
engage in an infringing use, show an affirmative intent that the product be used to infringe'"
420 F.3d 1369, 1379 (quoting Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2768). In MEMC, the evidence showed
that the alleged inducer had actual knowledge of the plaintiff's patent, and the evidence con-
tained email communications between the alleged inducer and direct infringer enabling the
direct infringer to purchase and use the accused product, as well as emails indicating that the
alleged inducer was not only aware of the potentially infringing activities of the direct in-
fringer but intended to encourage those activities. Id. at 1379-80. In Golden Blount, Inc. v.
Robert H. Peterson Co., the court cited both MEMC and Grokster regarding the intent stan-
dard for inducement of infringement. Golden Blount, 438 F.3d 1354, 1365 n.4 (Fed. Cir.
2006).
76. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2768.
77. Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 48 (1912) ("[A] sale of an article which,
though adapted to an infringing use, is also adapted to other and lawful uses, is not enough to
make the seller a contributory infringer. Such a rule would block the wheels of commerce."),
overruled on other grounds by Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243
U.S. 502, 517 (1917). See also Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (quoting the "wheels of commerce" language of Henry in the context of
copyright law).
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"historic kinship between patent law and copyright law,"' 8 the Court also
noted that they are not "identical twins. '79 In fact, I would characterize
the relationship as more that of extended family members than of sib-
lings. Fundamentally, the parameters of liability in each area, even for
direct infringement, are distinct. Direct infringement under the Patent
Act leads to strict liability; even independent creation of an invention
identical to the patented invention can result in infringement liability. On
the other hand, direct liability under copyright law does not attach where
the defendant independently created an identical work; rather, the defen-
dant must have inappropriately and illegally copied the protected work in
order to be held liable. Because the scope of direct infringement is so
different in the two areas, it would be naive to assume the scope of indi-
rect liability should be coterminous between copyright and patent law.
Furthermore, because the level of legal protection given to patents is
substantially higher than that given to copyrights, the "hoops" that a pat-
entee must jump through in order to obtain and enforce its limited
monopoly are much higher than those that a copyright holder must go
through to obtain relief from illegal copying. The trade-off between the
legal formalities attached to obtaining each type of intellectual property
protection and the degree of legal protection and relief given are careful
and considered policy choices, and certainly not ones which the courts
should set aside or dismiss too easily.
The dangers of importing secondary liability from patent law whole-
sale into copyright law also ought to be readily apparent. The history of
sections 27 1(b) and 271(c) of the Patent Act makes clear that these no-
tions of secondary liability developed in a context very specific to patent
law.8° Moreover, indirect infringement in the patent and copyright areas
typically arises in very different factual circumstances. In the patent area,
indirect infringement is usually tied to the infringement of a specific pat-
ent, and so is more bounded in scope. 8' Indirect infringement in the
copyright area, on the other hand, more commonly arises from the de-
velopment of technology that is capable of being used to infringe the
exclusive rights of copyright holders12 (such as the VCR in Sony or the
peer-to-peer networks in Grokster). This can lead to "open-ended" liabil-
ity for indirect infringement in the copyright area, as opposed to the
more finite liability attached to a specific patent in the patent law area. 3
78. Sony, 464 U.S. at 439.
79. Id. at 439 n.19.
80. See Adams, supra note 10, at 383-86 (discussing development of contributory li-
ability and inducement of infringement under patent law).
81. Id. at 397-98.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 398.
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This broader scope of liability, coupled with the weaker form of intellec-
tual property protection, argues for a higher intent standard in copyright
law than in patent law.
All of this suggests that the courts should avoid looking to Grokster
as a barometer of what the scope of secondary liability in the patent law
area should be. The courts have already stretched the bounds of indirect
infringement by importing patent law notions of indirect liability into the
copyright law arena; importing those distorted notions of indirect in-
fringement from the copyright law area back into patent law will only
further muddy the already murky waters of secondary liability.
If we ignore the impact of Grokster on patent law, however, we are
still left with a vexing question: what should the scope of inducement of
infringement in the patent law area be in light of the Federal Circuit's
intra-circuit split in Manville and Hewlett-Packard? This issue has drawn
the attention of several commentators in recent years, and Grokster has
served to heighten this scrutiny.
Recently, Professor Lemley proposed a "sliding scale" inquiry for li-
ability for inducement of patent infringement in which the variables of
conduct and intent "interact."8 Under his proposal, the less egregious the
defendant's conduct, the more specific the intent to induce infringement
must be to support liability,85 and vice versa-the more egregious the
defendant's conduct, the less intent that would be required for liability to
attach. In Lemley's view, direct infringers would be held strictly liable,
even if they did not know and could not possibly have known, that they
were infringing. This, of course, comports with current doctrine.8 6 Indi-
rect infringement, on the other hand, would require some element of
knowledge or intent. The more "integrally involved" the defendant is in
causing or encouraging the direct infringement, the closer the defen-
dant's culpability is to that of the direct infringer. 7 The difficulty, as
Lemley acknowledges, is in striking a balance between avoiding imposi-
tion of liability on a defendant who did not intend to cause an act that
turns out to be infringing, on the one hand, and avoiding letting "the
mastermind escape while punishing the servant "'88 on the other.
It is unclear why a direct infringer who did not know and could not
have known of his infringement should be held strictly liable, while an
indirect infringer who knows most of his end users are infringing, albeit
without his direct encouragement, should escape liability. Lemley fi-
nesses this issue by noting that patent law statutorily is a strict liability
84. Lemley, supra note 13, at 242-43.
85. See id. at 242-44.
86. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
87. Lemley, supra note 13, at 242.
88. Id.
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tort, and he leaves it at that.8 9 But, if Congress makes clear its intent of
making direct infringement a strict liability tort, why should the court
read a lesser standard into indirect infringement liability?
Professor Lemley's argument is premised upon his notion that pat-
ents are "inherently probabilistic" rights.90 A high percentage of patents
are held to be invalid when challenged in court, and the scope of invalid
patents is hard to determine within any precision.9' Thus, Lemley argues,
just because a defendant knows of the existence of a patent, his actions
do not necessarily indicate an intent to infringe upon the patent; rather,
the defendant may believe he successfully designed around the patent,
that the patent is invalid, or that the patent's claims do not cover the acts
that the defendant is assisting another to do.92 If it turns out that those
beliefs are wrong, Lemley argues, there is certainly direct infringement
by the end users, but it is far less clear that there is inducement to in-
fringe as well.
Professor Holbrook also addressed this topic recently. He argues that
an inducer should be liable only when there is an intent to induce in-
fringement, and not merely the intent to induce the acts that lead to
infringement. 93 This is essentially an argument for the Manville standard
over the Hewlett-Packard standard. Holbrook argues that this higher
standard is necessary so as to avoid both the potential anticompetitive
consequences of the Hewlett-Packard rule and the risk of punishing in-
nocent actors (i.e., those defendants whose actions resulted in indirect
infringement even though the defendants did not intend the infringe-
ment). 94 He contends that the rights of the patentee can be adequately
protected under such a rule provided that the rule is only applied so as to
insulate the inducer from past liability and not to protect the inducer
from prospective relief, including a permanent injunction.95
Holbrook's argument is premised upon his position that third party
liability in patent law should be the exception, not the rule, and that we
should avoid penalizing a "good" actor who truly believes that the other
parties involved (i.e., the end users) are not directly infringing.96 He ar-
gues that this rule is pro-competitive because it encourages parties to
enter the market if they have a good faith belief that there is no in-
fringement, and also creates an incentive to challenge potentially invalid
89. Id. at 243 n.78.
90. Id. at 243.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Holbrook, supra note 55, at 400.
94. Id. at 408-09.
95. Id. at 409.
96. Id. at 408.
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patents.9 The Hewlett-Packard standard, he argues, would chill competi-
tion by holding parties liable even if they viewed the patent as invalid or
not infringed, and the "public would pay the price in terms of reduced
competition, potentially higher prices, and even worse the existence of
invalid patents.,98
Both Lemley's and Holbrook's proposals are problematic in some
aspects. First, there is a pragmatic concern: how do we know when the
defendant's intent is "clear," as Lemley posits, or when the defendant
believes she is acting in good faith, as Holbrook discusses? We ought to
be wary of any rule that might create a disincentive for parties to explore
the potentially infringing ramifications of their actions. It could be coun-
tered that lack of full exploration of these issues would evidence a lack
of good faith, but that raises issues of judicial efficiency and economy.
We ought to be equally wary of rules that impose too great a burden
upon the courts to inquire into the mental state of defendants. If the stan-
dard is a subjective one--did this defendant actually intend to encourage
another to infringe?-problems of proof can quickly become insur-
mountable. An objective standard-evaluating what the defendant knew
or should have known-can help avoid the problem of a defendant who
carefully constructs her behavior and limits her actual knowledge to
avoid imposition of liability.
Second, a defendant who believes a patent is most likely invalid is
not necessarily left with the Hobbesian choice of either foregoing his
own invention or risking a suit for infringement should he proceed.
Rather, a party who believes an existing patent to be invalid or his ac-
tions to be non-infringing can often, though not always, choose to
challenge the validity of that patent in court through a declaratory judg-
ment prior to acting and thus prior to incurring potential liability for
infringement. There are obviously costs associated with this strategy,
both in terms of litigation costs and delay, and it is only available when
an "actual controversy" exists between the parties. 99 Nonetheless, the law
has long been clear that patents are presumed valid until proven other-
wise.' °° Thus, it seems neither remarkable nor unfair that a defendant
who chooses to forego pursuing a declaratory judgment action, in favor
97. Id. at 408-09.
98. Id.
99. To bring a declaratory judgment action under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2201, the plaintiff must show it: (1) has a "reasonable apprehension" of an infringe-
ment lawsuit; and (2) produces or practices, or is prepared to produce or practice, the allegedly
infringing device or method. Shell Oil Co. v. Amoco Corp., 970 F.2d 885, 887-88 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
100. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000) ("A patent shall be presumed valid.... The burden of estab-
lishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such
invalidity").
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of undertaking affirmative, potentially infringing action and waiting to
see if the patentee objects, must bear the risk of liability should the pat-
ent turn out to be valid and infringed.
Moreover, both commentators' arguments seem to highlight an im-
portant issue: which party should bear the risks of an incorrect
assessment of whether a particular behavior infringes? We can put the
risk of a good faith, but mistaken, belief as to non-infringement upon the
patentee, such as would occur if the alleged inducer were excused from
liability because of a lack of intent to induce. Or, we can place the risk
on the alleged infringer or inducer, such as would occur if the alleged
inducer were held liable for acts that led to direct infringement by an-
other.
The issue of where the risk of loss should fall is already answered in
part by the statutory provision for infringement damages under the Pat-
ent Act. Section 284 on its face evidences a desire to compensate the
patentee for the injury it has suffered, awarding damages adequate to
compensate the patentee for its loss.' Section 284 also evidences legis-
lative intent that the courts have the freedom to punish egregious
wrongdoers and deter future wrongdoers by imposing enhanced damages
at its discretion.102
Holbrook dismisses this argument by stating that there is no point in
having a distinction between willfulness and inducement because both
sections 27 1(b) and 284 address the same question of whether this party
is "morally culpable in some way."03 Yet, it seems to me that these two
sections address very different concerns. Section 284 reaches the issue of
whether a party, already determined to have been liable for infringement,
should pay enhanced damages in addition to the actual cost of injury in
an effort to punish and deter wrongdoers. Section 271(b), on the other
hand, addresses the question of whether an inducer should be held liable
for infringement and compensate the patent holder for its losses, i.e., the
actual damages incurred in the first place.
The choice of where the risk of injury should fall is highlighted by
the effect on liability of an opinion letter from competent patent counsel
as to non-infringement (a common strategy for demonstrating good
faith). Another commentator, Rader, has argued for the broader Hewlett-
Packard standard ("intent to induce the acts") on the grounds that the
narrower Manville standard would allow inducers to shield themselves
101. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000) ("Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the
claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement ... ").
102. Id. ("[T]he court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or
assessed.").
103. Holbrook, supra note 55, at 410.
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from liability too easily through the use of opinion letters.' °4 Indeed,
when we consider the effect of an opinion letter under Manville and
Hewlett-Packard, the effect of the differing standards is clear. Under
Hewlett-Packard, the existence of an opinion letter from competent pat-
ent counsel stating there was no infringement would have no effect upon
the defendant's liability as an inducer (though it could create a cause of
action for the inducer against the attorney). Under Manville, however,
the existence of such a letter, if it turned out to be incorrect, would not
lead to liability because the accused inducer would lack the requisite
intent to encourage infringement by another.
Again, it becomes a question of where the risk should fall. Is it fairer
to place the risk of an incorrect opinion letter upon the alleged inducer,
who would potentially have a cause of action for indemnification against
the attorney if the letter were the result of legal malpractice or negli-
gence? Or is it fairer to place the risk upon the patent holder, who is left
with no recourse against either the attorney or the inducer if the incorrect
letter did indeed lead to infringement? It seems fundamentally wrong to
leave the patent holder with no recovery for its loss. Moreover, prospec-
tive relief, such as a permanent injunction against further infringement,
does not compensate the patent holder for the losses it has already suf-
fered.
Rader argues that the Federal Circuit should adopt the Hewlett-
Packard standard, not just on the procedural ground of stare decisis, but
on the substantive grounds that the patent system seeks to find a balance
between benefiting society through early and complete public disclosure
of inventions and the harms created by giving inventors even limited
monopolies.'0 5 Infringement law, he argues, helps the patent system
achieve its goals by giving patent holders the necessary tools to enforce
their rights in court. Inducement law, in particular, is important in this
regard, because it allows patentees a remedy in situations where the rem-
edy against direct infringers might be hard to find or difficult to enforce.
Patent law, by policy and design, grants broad rights to patent hold-
ers in return for their full disclosure of their inventions to the public for
exploitation after the patent term has expired. The strict liability regime
for direct infringement reflects Congressional intent in this regard. A
significantly lesser standard of liability for indirect infringers, such as
that contemplated by Manville, throws the integrity of the system into
question. To the extent that concerns about indirect liability are driven by
104. Rader, supra note 24, at 314-15. Holbrook rejects this argument, stating that it is
not likely that inducers can easily immunize themselves by getting a pro forma opinion letter
and that we should not so easily discount the ethical obligations of the attorney. Holbrook,
supra note 55, at 410.
105. Rader, supra note 24, at 327-29.
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the high degree of likelihood that granted patents may be invalid,06t
seems the solution ought to be a reevaluation of the Patent and Trade-
mark Office's patent-granting procedures, not a diminution of the legal
rights afforded patent holders.
CONCLUSION
At the end of the day, the Supreme Court's opinion in Grokster does
little to help resolve some of the seemingly intractable problems sur-
rounding the intent element of inducement of infringement in patent law.
The opinion leaves many of the questions regarding the intent element of
inducement of infringement in copyright law unanswered as well. To
resolve the vexing issue of the proper standard for the intent element of
inducement of infringement in both areas, the courts and, preferably, the
legislature, must spend more time confronting the very different philoso-
phical underpinnings of these two areas of intellectual property law and
the very different policy choices each area represents.
106. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. EcON. PERSP. 72,
75-76 (2005) (discussing the probabilistic nature of patents and stating that only 0.1% of all
patents are litigated to trial, but of those, one-half are invalidated).
